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Abstract: The present article aims to offer a synoptic picture of communist 
Romania’s relations with Third World countries during the Ceaușescu regime. 
Within these relations, economic and geopolitical motivations coexisted along 
with ideological ones, thus making the topic one of the most interesting and 
relevant key for understanding RSR’s complex and cunning international 
strategy. However, I intend to prove that mere pragmatism is not enough to 
comprehend the drive behind Ceaușescu’s diplomatic efforts in post-colonial 
Africa; ideological factors need also to be taken into account. 
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Introduction 
Considering itself, since 1972, a ‘socialist developing country,’ the Romanian 
Socialist Republic (RSR) followed with this ingenious strategy a number of 
specific reasons, one of them consisting in diversifying its global commercial 
options, another to become a well-known and respected voice on the 
international stage, mostly in the emerging field of nonalignment and, last but 
not least, to obtain a symbolic and ideological prestige most useful for future 
international endeavors. As a ‘socialist developing country,’ RSR was paying a lot 
of attention to the ‘new international order’, a revolutionary concept consisting 
in the attenuation of global social, economic and geopolitical inequalities, in 
boosting the importance of small and middle states on the international scene 
and in permanently paving the way for the Leninist ‘new’ to the disadvantage of 
the bourgeois ‘old’.  
My working hypothesis resides in understanding RSR’s interest in post-
colonial Africa as a means to gradually be perceived, along with Yugoslavia, as a 
middle sized China within the matrix of tiermondism. Second, along with this 
symbolic prestige specific interests like gaining access to the Western industrial 
market or obtaining cheap natural resources, mostly oil, several minerals or 
wood are wrapped up. 
As far as the structure of the paper is concerned, the article starts with a 
detailed introduction which presents the appearance and controversies 
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surrounding nonalignment both as ideology and geopolitical practice, followed 
by a methodological and a literature review section, then by a short analysis of 
African post-colonial national ideologies with reference to Romanian national-
communism and a critical assessment of RSR’s acceptance into the so-called 
‘group of 77’. Finally, the conclusions of this whole scientific demarche are 
presented. Basically, RSR and the Third World African countries engaged in 
‘multilateral’ relations during the 1970s, relations entailed by very practical 
reasons, but boosted considerably due to ideological affinities between both 
parties. In the following decade, substantial changes within the international 
political economy brought the Romanian-Third World idyll to an abrupt, but 
predictable halt, proving that they are best understood as a component of the 
whole international environment during the second half of the Cold War. 
The states of the Third World – whose number simply exploded after 1950, 
once the decolonization process started, especially in Africa – represented for 
the RSR a new opportunity to manifest its independence in the sphere of 
international relations with reference to the Soviet Union. Therefore, once the 
events that allowed the dissident ally’s distancing from Moscow gradually 
became obsolete – the Sino-Soviet split or the tensions between East and West 
substantially reduced in the first half of the 1970s, once the Helsinki accords 
were signed – the so-called nonaligned movement of the young African, South-
American and Asian states became the new international playground for the RSR 
(Barnett 1992, 41). 
The nonaligned movement named, within the United Nations (UN), the 
‘group of 77,’ after the initial number of the founding states (quickly exceeded in 
a few years), was anticipated in 1955 through the Bandung conference, although 
it officially appeared at the beginning of the next decade. With this occasion, 
several international principles that would constitute the political backbone of 
the future nonaligned movement were adopted: the respect for human rights as 
they are defined in the UN charter, equal consideration for all races, nations and 
states, the recognition of the right of every state to individually or collectively 
defend itself, according to the UN principles, renouncing the use of aggressions 
and threats in the relations between states, the solving of international conflicts 
and disputes solely through peaceful means, the encouragement of international 
cooperation based on mutual interests and on the respect of international rules 
(Sprințeroiu 1985, 29-30). One of the founders of the movement, Ghana’s 
president (and a personal friend of Nicolae Ceaușescu), Kwame Nkrumah, 
eloquently expressed the aim of the nonaligned states: “We were born through 
protest and revolt against the international status-quo, due to the dividing of the 
world in two antagonistic blocs. We must permanently refuse to align ourselves 
with one or the other.” (quoted in Sprințeroiu 1985, 20-21)  
Sprințeroiu refuses to refer to the nonaligned movement as an alliance of 
the Third World countries, considering it rather as a ‘moral force’ capable of 
putting into perspective the interests of all developing states without creating a 
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political, ideological and military bloc. Furthermore, the nonaligned movement 
could not be equated with a mechanical equilibrium through which its member 
states would have tried to obtain benefits from both the West and the Soviet 
Union, because the whole essence of the movement consisted in the refusal of 
‘bloc policy’ and of ‘all forms of dependence,’ of coercing states in the field of 
international relations. The nonaligned movement wanted to democratize the 
relations between states and to create a global environment different from that 
of the Cold War, based on growing inequalities and recurrent crises – a new 
international order, one that appealed to the RSR more from pragmatic than 
from ideological reasons (see Sprințeroiu 1985, 44-45, 64-65). Nonalignment 
was not only a (geo)political option, but also an ideological one, therefore 
neither capitalism nor communism, in its European form, at least, could be 
directly extrapolated within the thinking and the practice of the young states, 
most of them African, which managed to win their independence despite the 
opposition of their former European oppressors. “Some would like the liberation 
movements to orient themselves towards class-struggle, like in Europe. Some 
would want them to become realist: a Don Quijote which throws himself over 
white skin windmills.” (Neto quoted in Dragoș 1982, 54). Federalization by tribal 
criteria was also rejected: the African nations in the making wanted only to 
inspire themselves from the political solutions of the North (capitalism, 
communism), not to copy them, reserving themselves the right to formulate their 
own political answers to the problems they encountered: “Our European friends 
need to make way in their thinking and conceptions to the necessary flexibility in 
order to understand that our countries, being in a development stage, must 
discover their own political formulas in the context of their situations and 
civilizations, which are very much different from that of the European or 
American countries.” (Ahidjo quoted in Dragoș 1982, 91-92). 
Nonaligned radicalism provoked even from the beginning the hostility of 
the United States, Great Britain and France, but also of the European Community 
as a whole, the last one managing, through economic pressures, to subordinate 
the raw materials and the markets of the former colonies (Sprințeroiu 1985, 54-
58; Quenum 1969, 18-19; Țurlea 1970, 19-20). Although the North-South 
polarization was, during the Cold War, and still remains, an undeniable reality, 
the three above quoted authors exaggerate: the young independent states could 
not have possibly survived in the absence of strong economic relations with the 
developed West, the most important global consumer of raw materials. And 
because these states, from reasons specific to colonialism, were obstructed to 
develop their own industries, they were effectively obligated by the structure of 
the global economy to play the role of raw material suppliers. However, on the 
long term, the reduction of global asymmetries could not be satisfactorily put 
into practice against rich states, but only with them as partners.  
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Methodological Aspects 
Beside the handy ideological explanations, it is certainly intriguing how a 
socialist country with problems relating to late and accelerated industrialization 
decided to place such an emphasis on its ‘unshaken friendship’ with poor, 
unstable and mostly political unpredictable Third World countries, many of them 
lacking even a basic infrastructure. Therefore, the proposed research questions 
are the following: isn’t RSR’s drive towards the Third World motivated, at least 
partially, by Ceaușescu’s ambition to achieve an important symbolic capital in 
international relations? Were the material aspects of this relation really 
rewarding, in the light of the institutional and administrative turmoil existing in 
the newly independent African countries? Last but not least, what role could we 
ascribe to ideological tenets in understanding the complex and often 
contradictory role RSR aspired to play in the development of post-colonial Africa? 
The working hypotheses I advance are strongly intertwined with the 
research questions presented above. Namely, that RSR’s interests in the Third 
World were both pragmatic and symbolic, on one hand, and that between 
Romanian national-communism and some post-colonial branches of African 
nationalism a powerful and compelling ideological common ground existed, on 
the other hand. 
Regarding the research steps, they are outlined as follows. First, I discuss 
concepts like nonalignment and the ‘new world order’ and their relevance for 
RSR and the Third World countries regarding their postures on the international 
scene. Second, I advance a concise theoretical presentation of concepts like 
‘blackness’ and ‘consciencism,’ focusing on how Romanian national-communism 
strived to construe ideological ties in their direction, insisting especially on the 
last one. Third, before the conclusions section, I once again bring into discussion 
the ‘new world order’ and how it applied to RSR’s struggling endeavor to be 
accepted as a full member of the ‘group of 77.’ 
Ideological and comparative analyses are the main methodological tools 
used to outline the hypotheses, the conclusions and the overall scientific 
argumentation put to work in this article. Contiguously, critical discourse 
analysis or radical constructivism are also important for shedding light on how 
RSR and some African Third World countries articulated their identities with 
reference to present political and geopolitical stakes. 
Some of the most important findings of the paper consist in pinpointing 
the congruency between Romanian industrial development plans and Third 
World’s objective of post-colonial reconstruction. Basically, Romania was, for its 
entire modern procommunist history, an agrarian periphery acting as a supplier 
of cheap cereals, natural resources and workforce for the West European capital. 
In this regard, RSR perceived in the national liberation struggle of the young 
African nations its own hypertrophied past of struggles, heroes, betrays and 
malicious foreign powers. Consequently, historical empathy gave way to 
ideological synergy, as both parts tried to obtain more maneuvering space with 
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reference to their specific hegemonic powers: The Third World in relation with 
Western Europe and the United States, and RSR in relation with the USSR, in the 
first place but, as the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s unfolded, in 
relation with Western powers as well. The RSR – Third World alliance was far 
more than a simple, occasional collaboration between states sharing exclusively 
common external objectives. It was, even if lacking any chance of success, an 
attempt of starting a counter-hegemonic movement in world politics, one in 
which the ‘chauvinism of great power,’ as it was called in RSR, would be 
contested and rejected to the end, even if the great power was the United States, 
the Soviet Union or, to a lesser extent, the European Economic Community. 
Literature Review 
Surprisingly, the scientific literature on the Romanian-Third World relations is 
considerably small even before the end of the Cold War. Afterwards, it is almost 
absent, with the notable exception of Thomas Barnet’s book, the first and, until 
now, only one dedicated entirely to RSR’s connections with the global South, a 
first class politological analysis of the subject. Of course, there is no shortage of 
national-communist propaganda, some of it intelligently and interestingly 
written. Reaching well beyond propaganda is Ioan Roșu-Hamzescu’s book 
Formarea cadrelor naționale în țările în curs de dezvoltare, which offers an 
interesting insight in RSR’s major contribution to the technical education of 
future engineers or doctors from different African countries. Furthermore, 
although adopting the official national-communist rhetoric, Ilie Șerbănescu’s 
articles are incisive, pertinent and they definitely point out the shortcomings of 
the international political economy during the 1980s, by far a creation of the 
highly developed Western world. Another relevant work is that of Voiculescu 
Marin and Voiculescu Elena, Renașterea Africană (1979), which discusses in 
length the ideological affinities between Third World national ideologies and 
Romanian national-communism. A useful working instrument is Dragoș 
Gheorghe’s chrestomathy Gândirea politică africană. Antologie (1982). Outside 
Romania, important scientific articles on the topic were written by Robert King 
and Collin Lawson, both insisting on the political and diplomatic aspects of the 
gradual rapprochement between communist Romania and African, South-
American or Middle-Eastern countries amidst decades of mutual ignorance, 
distrust, or even hostility. Radio Free Europe’s reports are excellent 
contemporary journalistic syntheses of the different turns and evolutions this 
political relationship undertook with the passing of the years. In post-communist 
Romania, one relevant article is that of Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu et al., „Les 
étudiants africains en Roumanie (1970‑1990). De l’internationalisme militant à 
la comercialisation des études” (2014). Then there is my own contributin from 
2011, ‘Aspects of a “brilliant assertion into the consciousness of the world”. The 
Third World in Socialist Romania’s foreign policy. Due to reasons of space and 
relevance, none of them was quoted in the present study.  
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I would emphasize that the present contribution is relevant because it 
insists on the importance of the ideological dimension in understanding the rest 
of the components that sum up RSR’s one of a kind partnership with Third World 
countries, especially African ones. In communist Romania, ideology was not 
simply a disposable layer which the regime could conveniently pt one and take 
off whenever the international situation called for it. On the contrary, national-
communism was firmly embedded in the internal and international practice of 
the political elite. Only Thomas Barnett’s and Voiculescu Marin and Voiculescu 
Elena’s books take this factor into account, but the last one is full with 
propagandistic clichés, while the first one, although excellent from many point of 
view, does not satisfactorily discuss concepts like ‘consciencism’ or ‘blackness’ 
and does not use at all critical discourse analysis or radical constructivism as 
methodologies. Although the present study makes use of these methodologies 
only tangentially, overall it does not adopt the positivist stance that Barnett’s 
book does, preferring interpretative over causal explanations. 
From ‘Blackness’ to ‘Consciencism’: the Emergence of African Post-colonial 
Nationalism and Its Ideological Ties with Romanian National-communism 
Two of the most important ideologies of nonalignment, ‘blackness’ and 
‘consciencism’ both emerged inside a violent and complex political space. The 
African decolonization process was abrupt and chaotic, concentrating itself on 
industrialization in the absence of infrastructure, technological know-how and 
education. Foreseeable, the result consisted in numerous economic and political 
crises, assassinations, and coup d’états (McWilliams and Piotrovski 1988, 232-
245). As an expression of this situation, political identities in the making were 
themselves contradictory, incompatible and many times simply incoherent. The 
main question of emerging nationalism was an unsurpassable one: were they 
products of European political culture or, although influenced by it, their roots 
were firmly grounded in pre-colonial African mythology? This puzzling dilemma 
was resolved by stating that the configuration of specific African political 
identities begun long ago before the European invasion which abruptly and 
irreversibly put an end to them. Although the new national revolutions were 
confined to a foreign territorial pattern, imposed by the former occupants, they 
were considered to be essentially original attempts to continue the lost legacy of 
pre-European African greatness (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 20‑26, 
37‑38; Senghor 1986, 41‑42). 
African theorists distinguished between two main alternatives in the 
process of national edification. One was the tribe and the extended family as 
premises for the new nations. As we will see, this alternative will constitute the 
one of the main theoretical drives for ‘blackness.’ Acting as intermediary 
between local and national identities, these two pre-national identities also 
guaranteed an original theoretical model which excluded the unwanted 
intrusion of Western political concepts (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 
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51-54). The other condemned tribalism as a means of the former colonial 
powers to ideologically maintain Africa subordinated and easily exploitable. 
Tribalism obstructed the creation of powerful and homogenous African nations, 
an evolution that would have hindered the West’s ambition within the Third 
World. Furthermore, tribalism was an alienated expression of the class struggle 
that nevertheless existed in Africa, despite apparent aspects that would have 
deemed it impossible. Intellectuals and politicians like Sékou Touré, Tom Mboya 
or Kwame Nkrumah argued, in Marxist-Leninist terms, that class struggle was a 
permanence of history and, in a specific form, it existed in Africa too, where a 
huge rural class lived along a small but rapidly growing proletarian class and an 
urban or rural bourgeoisie created to respond to the administrative needs of the 
former European colonists (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 40, 47-48, 54-
60). Both types of African nationalism, that we could name cultural nationalism 
and pro-communist nationalism, acted as ‘ideologies of late industrialization’ 
and were keen on obtaining the progress of this whole continent wronged by 
history either through the development of autochthonous cultural elements, 
either through a class struggle entailing the efforts of the rural class and of the 
proletariat against a bourgeoisie behaving as a transmission belt for colonial 
interests, a class struggle that would underline the newly found political 
independence with a more substantial economic one (Matossian in Hutchinson 
and Smith 1994, 218‑225; Cabral in Alcoff and Mendieta 2003, 55‑61). 
As expected, RSR supported the last version of African nationalism, the 
pro-communist one. Ghana’s president Kwame Nkrumah was a fierce adept of 
nationalization, a process that would restore African dignity and its rightful 
possession of vast and diverse natural resources. Nkrumah criticized other 
theorists of ‘patriarchal socialism’ or ‘African socialism’ like Julius Nyerere or 
Léopold Sédar Senghor for denying class struggle and for insisting too much on 
Africa’s cultural uniqueness, thus isolating it from the global class struggle 
against imperialism. While many African traditions were definitely worth 
keeping, other ones like rampant feudalism doubled by inequitable possession of 
land was not something to make Africans proud, Nkrumah argued. Due to 
theorists like Senghor, African socialism had lost its post war militancy and 
political relevance and became a mere cultural ornament for the personal 
ambitions of several theorists, among which Senghor was the most prominent. 
His concept of ‘blackness’ represented exactly this unwanted and pernicious 
culturalization of African socialism, rendering it as a mild and innocent form of 
claiming ‘a place in the sun,’ as the Chinese saying goes, for this continent 
ravaged by European capitalism in its most aggressive period. However, Africa 
cannot truly win its independence by appealing to the mercy of great powers; 
Africa needs to have its geopolitical and ideological rights recognized as an equal 
member of the global club of regions and continents (Marinescu 1986, 174‑175; 
Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 103‑105, 109; Tănăsie in Popişteanu 1989, 
149; Nkrumah 1973, 440‑445; Guibernau 1996, 124; Senghor 1986, 148). 
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As theorized by Nkrumah, ‘consciencism,’ represented a form of synthetic 
African dialectical materialism, one that would encompass Western, Islamic and 
Euro-Asiatic elements in order to offer Africa the political possibility to better 
grasp its position, advantages and perspectives on the world stage on the basis of 
an unique and non-recurring ontology. Consciencism was grounded in 
‘communalism,’ an idealistic form of African society existent in pre-colonial 
Africa that was to be adapted to present day realities and needs, not 
mechanically and uncritically revived (Tănăsie în Sprinţeroiu et al. 1989, 148-
150; van den Boogard 2017, 50-51). 
Furthermore, in the new political environment made possible by 
consciencism, the liberal system of multiple parties and free elections would 
have been harmful for consolidating the independence of this ancestral continent 
due to the fact that it would have perpetuated Western foreign interferences in 
African internal affairs. Only the Leninist vanguard party was suitable for the 
historic mission of obtaining and strengthening Africa’s independence in the 
context of internal and international class struggle (Nkrumah 1970, 100‑101; 
Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 68‑79, 83). 
Socialists like Senghor repelled the authoritarian one-party system in 
favor of multipartidism and representative democracy based on free elections 
(Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 1987; Senghor 1986, 148). This plural 
political system responded better to the needs of blackness, through which 
Senghor understood the overall cultural heritage of black people as manifested 
in their day to day existence. As ancient Greece offered the world reason, Africa 
offered the world blackness, a specific emotion deeply stratified within the 
historical and cultural layers of African becoming. Of course, Nkrumah fiercely 
rejected blackness as a cultural setback of African global political struggle, a 
totally useless, when not wholly dangerous, ‘metaphysics of knowledge’ 
(Nkrumah 1973, 443‑445; Marinescu 1986, 185‑187). 
Romanian national-communism was especially fond of consciencism. Both 
shared the adamant conviction in the Leninist party as vehicle of historical and 
social progress. Both were culturally eclectic and politically one-sided. As 
consciencism insisted on recuperating the African past in order to fit the present 
and future political struggles, Romanian national-communism also integrated a 
discursively articulated heroic past in order to legitimize the existing political 
regime. Unlike conservative nationalism, which valued above all the past, or 
liberal nationalism, placing emphasis first of all on culturally and institutionally 
construed citizenship, national-communism was very pragmatic oriented and in 
the same time extremely exclusivist: it aimed to mold a new type of nationalism 
centered around the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in order to militantly 
inspire the population to assume the regime’s developmental imperatives as its 
own. In the realm of international relations, Romanian national-communism did 
not benefit from the privileged discursive position it had within the Romanian 
borders; consequently, it was compelled to adopt more flexible discursive 
Third World Themes in the International Politics of the Ceaușescu Regime  
29 
strategies and to play the role of a global moralizer, secretly suffering because it 
was not a superpower (Popescu 1993, 307). Regarding blackness, the ideological 
substance of the concept was condescendingly considered as a ‘petite-bourgeois’ 
simulacra of a revolutionary notion, too much inclined towards the liberal 
political philosophy in order to count as truly relevant from an ideological 
standpoint. However, like in the case of Eurocommunism, while the political 
doctrines per se were treated with disbelief, their contextual political usefulness 
came handy on many occasions. Therefore, Senghor’s works were translated in 
Romanian and he was esteemed as one of the most important and prolific 
theorist of African renewal. As the Romanian saying goes, make yourself brother 
with the devil until you cross the bridge.  
Forging the ‘New International Order’: An Overview of RSR’s Acceptance 
into the Group of 77 
As already mentioned in the introductive section of the paper, the nonaligned 
movement represented for the RSR not only an opportunity to maintain its 
dissident foreign policy, initiated in the 1960s, but also a means of legitimating 
the official discourse within the Romanian borders (Barnett 1992, 2). Mircea 
Malița, a Romanian diplomat with a prodigious career, remembers that RSR 
could have become a member of the group of 77 even from 1964, the year the 
group was constituted within the UN, but, in the context of its alienation with 
reference to the ‘socialist camp,’ the Romanian leadership preferred to maintain 
its attention on European political problems and especially on USSR (Malița 
2015, 349-350). 
Despite their diplomatic and ideological closeness, RSR and the other East-
European regimes were competing with Third World countries when it came to 
the access of their products to the Western markets. Far from being worried by 
this evolution of the relations between East-European regimes and the Third 
World countries, the Soviet Union derived some advantages from it. First of all, 
Moscow could easily retract the assistance offered to a Third World state in case 
of civil war or in case of a hostile Western reaction – without entirely eliminating 
the communist influence from the region. Next, the Soviet assistance was made 
more efficient by the fact that Czechslovakia’s military technology and the 
German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) communicational abilities were promptly 
put to its disposal. Furthermore, through the participation of the East-European 
regimes in helping Third World countries, the pressure upon the Soviet budget 
oriented to the same goal was lowered. Finally, East-European assistance 
attenuated the sensation that the Soviet Union involves itself with Third World 
countries just to military compete with the West (Barnett 1992, 14-17).  
RSR signed more treaties of friendship and cooperation with Third World 
countries than the Soviet Union did and also emphasized itself among the other 
East-European regimes in this regard, leading Thomas Barnett to affirm that the 
RSR – which named itself starting with 1972, in order to underline its solidarity 
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with the nonaligned movement, a ‘socialist developing country’ – aspired to 
become a bridge not only between East and West, but also between North and 
South. Comparing himself with Tito or Mao, Ceaușescu “wanted to position 
himself with reference to Moscow as a natural leader of an increasingly 
radicalized and (possibly) socialist Third World. In this time, he planned to 
transform Romania into a ‘Japan of Europe,’ a middle sized state with great 
economic authority” (Barnett 1992, 47; see also Linden 1987, 58-59; King 1978, 
879). But, at the end of the 1970s, in the context of an alarming increase in oil 
prices, of the oscillations of the international economy and of some uninspired 
investments, the relations between RSR and the Third World began to visibly 
diminish in terms of commercial volume, despite keeping the bombastic rhetoric 
against imperialism and neocolonialism.  
Maoism represented for the RSR the main ideological inspiration source in 
the process of its rapprochement with the Third World. Romanian national-
communism also borrowed from Maoism numerous defining elements: militant 
art and literature, voluntarism, romanticism, the correctness and responsibility 
of activists, indispensable for a proper construction of socialism, hostility 
towards anarchic manifestations and towards erroneously understood liberty, in 
the absence of necessity to which liberty is connected within every phase of the 
advancement of history upon revolutionary coordinates, respectively the 
critique of bureaucracy and small-bourgeois commodity which alters the 
revolutionary spirit of the party (Tsetung 1971, 134-136, 275, 368-369, 437, 445; 
Țze-Dun 1955, 347-348). 
Ceaușescu also inspired himself from the propaganda and ideology of 
North Koreea (Sung 1976, 588-593), also derived from Maoism. Maoism – which, 
as James Gregor points out, through its ‘reactive and developmental nationalism’ 
aiming to mobilize the ‘masses’ in the name of national rebirth, for too long 
obstructed by what Mao named the ‘foreign national yoke,’ and by dividing 
nations between ‘proletarian’ and ‘bourgeois’ and discursively creating a global 
conflict which will eventually end with the victory of the first – becomes 
intelligible with the help of fascist rather than Marxist theories (Gregor 2000, 
207-208; Țze-Dun 1957, 506-507). Regarding the Third World, the Chinese 
communists affirmed even from the end of the 1940s, an opinion that later made 
its way into the RSR (Voiculescu and Voiculescu 1979, 58-60; see also Marinescu 
quoted in Marinescu 1984, 141-143), that the effervescent nationalism 
manifested by the former European colonies, despite the fact of being ‘bourgeois’ 
in its essence is, in the global revolutionary equation, a progressive one, and thus 
needs to be supported by all (Chao-Tsi 1949, 43-44). 
Adopted as a UN program in 1974 at the initiative of the nonaligned 
movement (Senghor quoted in Dragoș 1982, 375), the new international order 
foresaw the attenuation and finally the elimination of the economic disparities 
existent between North and South through intensifying the efforts against 
colonialism, which obstructed the emergence of a much more fair international 
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status-quo (Stanciu 1979, 65-70; Giorgios quoted in Dragoș 1982, 156-157). The 
new instruments of colonialism, more efficient than military intimidation and 
direct economic exploitation, were multinational companies. These were guilty 
for threatening the independence of the young developing states through 
neglecting and even intensifying the social problems which already existed there, 
through supporting the reactionary forces from these countries, blackmailing 
them to obtain new concessions in order not to move their business elsewhere 
and, in general, deepening the Thirld World’s dependence on Western capital 
(Bogdan quoted in Florea, Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 251-253; Moise quoted 
in Florea, Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 269-277; Seftiuc quoted in Florea, 
Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 354; Elian 1977, 125-139). However, the economic 
and demographic growth rates of the South were growing, and the prognoses for 
the year 2000 anticipated new quantitative jumps of developing states which, 
RSR argued, had to be encouraged through a qualitative change of the 
international environment on the whole. And that could only mean one thing: the 
implementation of the new international order.  
Due to an efficient and assertive diplomacy, RSR signed numerous treaties 
with African states, in which it committed to financially and materially 
contribute to their independence (see Vais 2012, 433-451). Few of these treaties 
entailed concrete benefits, at least until the end of the 1970s when, due to the 
recession of the global economy and the increase of oil prices, Romania started 
to massively invest in sub-Saharan Africa in order to gain access to the cheap 
energy sources and markets from the region (Romanian industrial products 
being refused, due to their low quality, more and more on the western markets). 
Joint societies were created, in which the Romanian part contributed with 
technology, experts and capital, and the African part with the working force and 
raw materials. In this way, RSR could sell some products on the western markets, 
these being presented as made in Africa. But when, due to international 
economic conditions, the States of the Third World asked for more concessions 
from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) member states, the 
RSR opposed, arguing that the responsibility for economic development belongs 
to each nation individually (Barnett 1992, 67-68; Roșu-Hamzescu 1979, 119-
120). 
On the other hand, one cannot deny that RSR substantially contributed to 
the financial help of the Third World countries, especially before becoming a 
member of the ‘group of 77’ (1976), providing almost a third of the amount 
granted by all East-European regimes. For RSR’s budget, the numbers were 
impressive: Argentina and Algeria – 100 million dollars (1972); Brasil - 180 
million dollars (1975); Egypt – 230 million dollars (1972-1974); Iran – 135 
million dollars (1968-1969); Syria – 170 million dollars (1971-1974); Guinea – 
80 million dollars (1974) (SR/Romania: 22 December 1975, 1-8; „România şi 
schimburile...”: 2 April 1975, 7). RCP even created a “solidarity and support fund 
of the national liberation movements, of the young independent states” and “of 
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developing countries,” an initiative “received with warm approbation by the 
Romanian people” (Botoran and Unc 1977, 227). RSR’s support was not limited 
to the financial component, but expanded towards forming the ‘cadres’ 
specialized in different fields of industrial engineering that would have built 
afterwards socialism in their origin countries, thus ensuring their prosperity and 
independence (Roșu-Hamzescu 1979, 111-122; Dezvoltarea colaborării și 
solidarității... 1978, 21-22). 
As a self-proclaimed socialist developing country, the RSR had greatly to 
suffer from the global recession that occurred at the end of the 1970s: the 
massive industrialization policies, way beyond the country’s real possibilities, 
now proved, along with the growing fuel prices RSR had to import sometimes 
from thousands of miles away, their lack of inspiration. The short term solution 
resided in borrowing money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, a fact which further deepened the country’s foreign debt 
because, during crises, the interest rates of money go up. Confronted with this 
disappointing solution, for which the West bears the major responsibility, 
Ceaușescu blamed the ‘neocolonialist interest rates’ which only limited the 
progress chances of developing countries and deepened the inequalities between 
the West and the Third (Cercelescu in Practici imperialiste...: 1982, 133). For 
Third World countries, the situation was even worse. Practically, at the end of 
the 1950s, “a field car could be bought by a Latin-American with the equivalent 
of 124 coffee bags, and today (1977, my note) it necessitates the equivalent of 
344 coffee bags. A rubber exporting country could purchase, in 1960, with 25 
tons of products, 6 tractors, and today only 2 tractors”(Popescu quoted in Mitran 
and Lotreanu 1977, 47). In order to combat these worrying tendencies, RSR 
proposed the reconfiguring of interest rates as follows: 5% for developing 
countries and credits without interest rates or with a maximum interest rate of 
2-3% for the less developed countries. On the whole, it was desirable that “the 
maximum level of the interest rate not to grow beyond 8%” (Șerbănescu in 
Practici imperialiste... 1982, 108). Indeed, beside the propagandistic exacerbation, 
the situation was alarming. In 1970, for example, from the loans contracted by 
developing countries (14, 3 billion dollars), only 45% were effectively cashed by 
these, “the rest representing interest rates, commissions and due rates of 
previous loans, while in 1980, from the 96,5 billion dollars, only 30% entered 
into the possession of the debtors”(Stănescu in Practici imperialiste...: 1982, 139). 
Due to the combined pressures of developing countries within the UN, the 
interest rates begun to diminish in the second half of the 1980s. But the 
prospects still remain worrying for debtors, because the number of credits with 
variable interest rates went up while the reimbursement terms of the credits 
went down.  
It is clear now that RSR’s situation progressively deteriorated during the 
1980s and the alliance with the nonaligned movement started to become a real 
burden. But the circumstances through which the rapprochement between RSR 
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and the nonaligned movement occurred were very much different. Presenting 
itself as a ‘developing socialist country,’ RSR took into account not only a global 
political stake – the continuation of its dissident foreign policy – but also an 
economic stake at a regional scale. In 1971, the European Community announced 
some concessions to the imports from developing countries, namely Third World 
countries, a development that greatly interested the Romanian leadership. In 
order to legitimate its new position, RSR begun the adhering procedures to the 
‘group of 77’ (Lawson 1983, 366; King 1978, 880-882, Căpățînă, Miga-Beșteliu 
and Tănăsescu 1973, 38-39). Emphasizing the velocity and the efficiency with 
which it built socialism, RSR tried to become, as we have seen, a model for Third 
World countries, for economic reasons (obtaining facilities at the exports for 
Western markets), for political reasons (maintaining and consolidating its 
dissidence towards Moscow) and nevertheless for ideological and historical 
reasons (the affirmation of independence and of the national state as the main 
actor of the new international order and of the similarities between the present 
of Third World peoples and the past of the Romanian people, on its turn 
subjugated by oppressive empires) (see Politica externă... 1972, 129-130; Vadim 
Tudor 1983, 237; Caraciuc 1974, 72-73; Lache quoted in Mitran and Lotreanu 
1977, 430). Later, both before and after RSR became a member of the ‘group of 
77,’ numerous African leaders, motivated, among other things, by Ceaușescu’s 
consistent financial help, referred to him, among others, as an ‘example’ from 
which they could can learn a lot ‘in elaborating their way (…) to socialism’ 
(Solidaritate militantă... 1977, 77, 25, 109; Bourguiba Jr. 1968, 9; Bourguiba 1968, 
6-7; Okumba D’Okwatsegue 1975, 8-9; Malecela 1974, 7-8; Voiculescu and 
Voiculescu 1979, 117-118). 
 RSR’s integration into the ‘group of 77’ represented the most credible 
moment in its campaign to present itself as a ‘socialist developing country’ 
(Barnett 1992, 62), being the result of a long and laborious process entailed in 
1964. But “the group was organized in regional sections, Asian, African and 
Latin-American, and Romania was not acceptable for none of these sections. 
Doubts regarding the acceptance of non-regional members, Romania’s motives, 
the effect which its position as a CMEA member would have had upon the 
group’s negotiation possibilities, led to its rejection” (Lawson 1983, 365). 
Encouraged by the fact that Yugoslavia was included in the group, in the Asian 
section, being also a member of the nonaligned movement, RSR perseverated, 
constantly supporting the group within the UN (Nicolae 2000, 171-172). In 1976, 
the Latin-American section of the group announced its intention to include RSR 
in the case it had no pretention to take part in the ‘specific decisions of the 
countries from this area.’ But the Arab states manifested their opposition, due to 
the fact that RSR was not present to the voting, within the UN, of a resolution 
incriminating Zionism; wishing to maintain good relations with Israel, RSR was 
absent and the resolution was not adopted. Next, the African countries opposed, 
along with Yugoslavia. As independent and nonaligned the RSR pretended to be, 
Emanuel Copilaș 
34 
its affiliation to CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) undoubtedly 
transformed it into a promoter of the policies of the ‘socialist bloc’ (Nicolae 2000, 
174; Gafton and the Romanian Section 23 May 1979, 7-8). Finally, the efforts of 
Romanian diplomats paid and RSR was accepted into the ‘group of 77.’ The event 
was emphatically presented in the Romanian press and in the foreign affairs 
books and propaganda materials, RSR’s new found quality confirming “a 
principle convincingly supported by our party, by its general secretary namely 
that it does not exist and it cannot exist a reason for which a socialist country 
being in the same time a developing country not to act as a member of the ‘Group 
of 77’” (Ene and Bogdan in Ene 1985, 209). Or, in other words, “the essential 
resides not in the appurtenance or non-appurtenance to different political-
military groups, but in the positions and way of action of states for the 
affirmation of the new international relations, in actively promoting the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, of the essential objectives, of the cause of 
peace, independence sovereignty, tempering and international collaboration” 
(Sprințeroiu in Popişteanu: 1989, 30; see also SR/ Romania 19 August 1976, 2 
and Ciorănescu 1976, 1-8). 
Concluding Remarks 
Although economic pragmatism was the main drive behind RSR’s decision to 
improve its relations with the Third Word during the 1970s, ideological 
considerations played an important role in this process. Romanian national-
communism aimed to influence national-liberation movements, to export in the 
area its own ‘revolutionary’ model, different from that of the Soviet Union. Its 
failure has a lot to do with the internal flaws of the model itself, but also with 
external factors such as the oil crises from 1973 and 1979. Overall, raw materials 
from the Third World represented an important supply alternative for a highly 
industrialized RSR in a more and more unstable economic world, while the 
Romanian know-how and industrial technology benefited the young 
independent states in the process of consolidating their independence. The 
relation was mutually satisfactorily until the 1980s neoliberalism drove both 
parties to more precautious international economic approaches, shattering their 
dreams of authentic independence, on one hand, respectively RSR’s ambition to 
become a middle-sized power acting as a natural leader of a radicalized national-
revolutionary global movement, on the other hand. 
This article insisted on how material factors intertwined with ideological 
factors in making possible the complicated and sinuous rapprochement between 
RSR and the African Third World countries, pinpointing that national-communist 
ideology was not a facile camouflage for an otherwise pragmatic and ruthless 
political elite, but was inscribed into its cognitive, epistemological and 
behavioral code. Future research should take into account to a greater extent 
empirical factors and, maybe, concentrate on more particular issues, such as 
RSR’s relations with one or two Third World countries, or maybe the whole 
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Third World, not only its African dimension. As a synoptic assessment of the 
subject, my study is unavoidable improvable when it comes to empirical issues 
and the it could also be vulnerable due to its systematic reliance on arguments 
based ultimately on generalizations, maybe even some risky ones. 
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